FILED COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF WASHINGTON THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Division II

No. 13-1-00597-1

In re PERSONAL RESTRAINT PETITION of:

Anthony D. Parker Petitioner

#### Personal Restraint Petition

On Appeal From the Kitsap County Superior Court THE HONORABLE LEILA MILLS

Petitioner's Opening Brief

Motion to Supress Evidence is Attached as Appendix #5 Anthony D. Parker #776122 Stafford Creek Corr. Ctr. 191 Constantine Way Aberdeen, WA 98520

#### I. INTRODUCTION

COMES NOW the Petitioner Anthony D. Parker, Pro Se, and appears for the above-captioned matter to challenge the decision from the Kitsap County Superior Court pursuant to RAP 16.7. The Petitioner was charged and convicted of human trafficking, promoting prostitution, assaults, possession of a firearm, kidnapping, and burglary, and was sentenced to 50 years on January 14, 2014. The Petitioner appealed his conviction with Division II but was transferred to Division I due to overwhelming case loads.

Under COA No. 73667-1-I the court affirmed issues on appeal but remanded on one PRP claim to Kitsap Superior Court for a reference hearing pursuant to RAP 16.12.

In Petitioner's PRP, Parker asserted that Bremerton Police illegally seized one Johanna Holliday's cell phone as evidence. The Court ordered a reference hearing, and for Kitsap County Superior Court to make a full determination on the merits of Parker's claim that there was an illegal seizure of the cell phone of another party, whereinunder lies his claim for relief. See <a href="Appendix 1">Appendix 1</a>, Court of Appeals instructions.

The matter was set for argument at Kitsap Superior Court on November 6, 2017, wherein Judge Leila Mills denied Parker's claim on November 13, 2017. See <u>Appendix 2</u>, Ruling of Hon. Leila Mills.

#### II. FACTS

On April 4, 2013, Detective Rauback observed two females, Johanna Holliday and Alisia Crettol, meet with one Travier Stevenson, a man they reported sold and used Percocet pills. Holliday got in the truck with Stevenson, and minutes later returned to Ms. Crettol's car. They drove away. Detective Rauback followed them and coordinated with patrol officers to stop the Ford Escort Crettol was driving. Detective Heffernan responded to the location of the stop, escorted Holliday to a patrol vehicle, and explained that she was pulled over for a possible drug transaction that had just occurred "as well as other crimes related to prostitution."

Detective Heffernan asked Holliday how many pills she had gotten from Stevenson. Holliday answered that she had gotten one pill from Stevenson. Det. Heffernan asked her where she had put the pill, and Holliday responded that it was in her purse, which was sitting on the passenger seat of the vehicle. Det. Heffernan went to the vehicle and withdrew the purse as well as a cell phone. He showed Holliday the phone and asked if it was hers. She responded that it was. She was asked to identify the phone number. The detective called the number, confirmed it, and took the phone.

Because Holliday agreed to meet with detectives the

following day to make a recorded statement regarding her criminal activities, she was released from detainment and allowed to drive away, even though she was in possession of drugs.

Holliday did not show up on April 5th to interview with the police. A warrant was applied for four days later on April 8. The contents of the cell phone revealed Parker's email account with Backpage, pictures of Holliday, and text messages sent from Parker. After the search of the cell phone, detectives set up a sting to arrest Holliday. On April 12, 2013, a detective posing as a client met with Holliday at a motel where she was arrested. A second cell phone was seized. Holliday spoke with the detective and on that occasion made incriminating statements against Parker. A warrant was issued and Mr. Parker was arrested April 13, 2013, for human trafficking and possession of a firearm. Mr. Parker's cell phone was seized at that time.

In sum, at no point during the traffic stop on April 4, 2013, was Holliday detained for prostitution or sex crimes. Holliday did not acknowledge to the detective that she was prostituting, nor was she asked if she was in the area of the suspected drug transaction for prostitution. Neither Holliday nor Stevenson were arrested on drug charges. Thus, the seizure of the phone on April 4 could not have been incident to an arrest. In addition, the seizure of the

other phone on April 12, 2013, incident to Holliday's arrest, and her giving statements of other crimes, was the direct result from the initial seizure and examination of the cell phone on April 4th. There were no police reports produced to support Parker's charges of burglary, possession of a firearm, kidnapping, or assaults.

The defense asserts that but for the seizure of the cell phone during the April 4 traffic stop, the officer would not have had evidence of Parker's alleged involvement at that particular time. In other words, there was no other evidence to support those convictions independent of the evidence from the cell phone that allegedly linked Parker to prostitution and human trafficking.

## ARGUMENT Automatic Standing

Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Washington provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without Authority of Law." This provision differs from the Fourth Ammendment of the U.S. Constitution in that Art. 1§7 "clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no express limitations." State v. White, 97 Wn.2d, 110, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). See also Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 111. Accordingly, while Art. 1§7 necessarily encompasses those legitimate expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment,

its scope is not limited to subjective expectations of privacy, but more broadly protects "those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held and should be entitled to hold, safe from government trespass absent a warrant." State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d at 494; (1944).

The Supreme Court has held that private affairs include information obtained through a cell phone. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash.2d 862, 869-70, 319 P.3d 9 (2014).

Here the court erred when it denied Parker his constitutional right to challenge the unlawful seizure of another person's cell phone (girlfriend) which held a wealth of Parker's private information, such as emails including an account that held pictures of Holliday in Backpage ads, as well as text messages. See <a href="Appendix 4">Appendix 4</a>, private information. The Superior Court stated that Parker lacks standing to challenge the seizure of Holliday's phone, citing <a href="State v.Jones">State v.Jones</a>, 146 Wn.2d 328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002).

A person may rely on the automatic standing doctrine only if the challenged police action produced the evidence sought to be used against him. To Assert automatic standing, a defendant (1) must be charged with an offense that involves possession as an essential element; and (2) must be in possession of the subject matter at the time of search and seizure.

Here, Parker was charged with possession of a firearm

in the first degree, arising from the unlawful seizure of a cell phone. The Court is invited to look at this series of events that begin with a warrantless seizure of a cell phone leading to the accused and to the firearm involved in the arrest.

On April 4, Ms. Holliday was detained for a possible drug transaction. The detective went to the car to remove Holliday's purse and cell phone. The cell phone was removed from the car without consent. Detective Heffernan stated that he was keeping the phone without consent, and Holliday was release from her detainment and was allowed to drive away, even though she was in possession of drugs. On April 8, four days later after this unlawful seizure, a warrant was applied for, which showed Parker's email and text messages. Officers then set up a sting and arrested Holliday on April 12. Ms. Holliday was interviewed with detectives and spoke very extensively about a firearm of Parker's. A warrant was sought for Mr. Parker and the firearm. See Appendix 3, Complaint for Search Warrant dated April 8, pg. 7, Complaint for Search Warrant dated April 23, pg. 4-7, RP 812-14.

Here the police could not have constitutionally executed the arrest warrant, much less conducted a search incident to an arrest, absent the unlawful seizure of the phone.

Absent a valid warrant to seize Holliday's cell phone, all evidence obtained from the search of that phone must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree. State v.

Meaghan, 165 Wn.App. 782, 266 P.3d 222 (2012).

Also, the court held that Jones had standing to challenge the search of a non-arrested individual's belongings. <u>Jones</u>, 146 Wn.2d at 339. This Court is asked to so hold.

Parker's private affairs, which are protected by

Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution,
and by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, were
disturbed when Detective Heffernan unlawfully seized a cell
phone as evidence to be used against Parker absent a warrant
and without consent.

Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution protects against unlawful intrusions into private affairs.

State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656. 663, 222 P.3d 92 (2004). Warrantless searches and seizures are presumed unlawful unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.

State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 141, 187 P.3d 248 (2008). Consent is a recognized exception to the requirement. State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 131, 101 P.3d 80 (2004).

In Parker's case there is evidence that Ms. Holliday did not consent to the seizure of her phone. Without a warrant, and without conforming to an exception to the

warrant requirement, Detective Heffernan violated Article 1, Section 7, Washington Constitution. Because there is evidence that Holliday did not consent to the seizure of her phone, Parker should have standing to challenge, since it was used against him. Since the cell phone was seized without a warrant, and since there was no valid exception and no consent, any evidence derived from that search, such as possession of a firearm and other offenses, becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and any subsequent conviction must be overturned. State v. Hinton, 174 Wn.2d at 882. (See Appendix 3, Complaint for Search Warrant dated April 8, pg. 7 at 18-22 where detective stated he "took the phone.")

On April 4 when Detective Heffernan unlawfully seized Holliday's cell phone, his incentive is very clear; he was looking for and gathering evidence of Parker's involvement with Holliday and prostitution.

In balancing the legitimate needs of law enforcement to obtain information in criminal investigations against the privacy interest of individuals, the Washington Privacy Act, RCW 9.73, unlike similar statutes in other states, tips the balance in favor of individual privacy at the expense of law enforcement's ability to gather evidence without a warrant.

State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d at 872.

As a prerequisite to claiming an unconstitutional search and seizure under Wash. Const. Article 1 Section 7, a

defendant must demonstrate that he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item seized. This involves a two-part test. The defendant must show that (1) he or she had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy by seeking to preserve something as private, and (2) society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.

When the cell phone was unlawfully seized on April 4, these facts existed: (1) Parker had an expectation of privacy for his email account and text messages (i.e. they were things he wished to preserve as private); (2) society recognized a general expectation of privacy in emails and communication through text messages; and (3) the cell phone was seized without consent, without a warrant, and was not obtained incident to arrest.

Evidence obtained as the result of an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed regardless of whether suppression will promote the objectives of the exclusionary rule. State v. Boland, 115 Wn. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990).

As a general rule, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. A few jealously guarded exceptions to the warrant requirement may justify a warrantless intrusion. The burden is always on the State to prove one of these narrow exceptions. The Washington Supreme Court has stated: "The ultimate teaching of our case law is that police may not abuse their authority to conduct a warrantless search or

seizure under a narrow exception to the warrant requirement when the reason for the search or seizure does not fall within the scope of the reason for the exception." State v. Kypreos, 110 Wn.App. 625, 39 P.3d 371 (2002).

The court erred in stating Parker lacks standing to challenge the unlawful seizure of the cell phone on April 4 that led to his arrest along with a firearm. However, under the decision of <u>State v. Simpson</u>, 95 Wn.2d 182, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980), Parker has standing to challenge the legality of the police seizure of that cell phone, and the right to invoke all the privacy interests that an individual properly in possession of the property could assert.

Automatic standing allows a remedy which protects us all in the end by protecting the accused in the beginning. Under this doctrine, the defendant "has the right to invoke all the privacy interests that an individual properly in possession of the property could assert." Simpson, 95 Wash.2d at 182, 622 P.2d 1199. Denying protection to a defendant who meets the doctrine's requirements "allows the invasion of a constitutionally protected interest to be insulated from judicial scrutiny by a technical rule of 'standing.' The inability to assert such an interest threatens all of Washington's citizens, since no other means of deterring illegal searches and seizures is readily available." Id. at 180, 622 P.2d 1199.

In <u>State v. Hinton</u>, Mr. Hinton was charged with Possession of a controlled substance. Officers made a warrantless search of another person's cell phone, then texted Hinton for a drug buy. Hinton met with the person he thought owned the phone, but it was the police and Hinton was arrested. Hinton challenged the warrantless search of another's cell phone. The court stated that in the absence of express consent from the phone's owner, the sender of a text message should be allowed to stand in the shoes of the phone owner for purposes of challenging the search of the

phone through which the text message was viewed. State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d at 881, 319 P.3d 9 (2014).

In Parker's case, the warrantless seizure of the cell phone on April 4 led to Parker's arrest and seizure of a firearm. Absent that unconstitutional seizure of the cell phone there would be no possession of a firearm, human trafficking, kidnapping, assaults, burglary, promoting prostitution, nor would there have been an arrest for Mr. Parker.

When an unconstitutional search or seizure occurs, all subsequently uncovered evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed. State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 360.

"To deal with the question of standing we must first recall what the majority has apparently forgotten: the purpose of Automatic Standing is to protect all of our rights against unconstitutional search and seizure by removing the incentive, or profit, which prompts the unconstitutional act. Although in many, if not most, instances the evidence unconstitutionally seized is sought to be used against the person whose constitutional rights have been violated, there are also those situations where the fruit of the tree poisoned by the constitutional deprivation is sought to be used against a third person whose particular rights were not violated by the

unconstitutional search of another. Granting the third person 'automatic standing' to seek suppression of the unconstitutionally seized evidence therefore provides the government an incentive to refrain from unconstitutional conduct." State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d at 29; 11 P.3d 714 (2000).

#### Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches and seizures that offend the Fourth Amendment are unlawful, and evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result of such invasions is considered 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. United States v. McClendon, 713 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2013).

On November 13, 2017, the court erred stating that Parker lacked standing to challenge the seizure of another's cell phone that was taken without consent or warrant, nor was obtained incident to arrest.

If the Automatic Standing exception is eliminated, Mr. Parker can still challenge the seizure of Ms. Holliday's phone under the Fourth Amendment if he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. State v. Boot, 81 Wn.App. 546, 550, 915 P.2d 592

(1992). An accused must establish more than a legitimate presence. Under the Fourth Amendment, there must be both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy to be reasonable. State v. Carter, 74 Wn.App. at 329-30. Parker's communication through text messages, and an email account with provocative pictures of Holliday, are recognized by this state as private affairs. See State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 862, 319 P.3d 9 (2014); also United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008).

In <u>Evans</u>, our Supreme Court held that a privacy interest could exist even in an item the defendant did not own. <u>State v. Evans</u>, 159 Wn.2d at 406-09.

The Complaint for Search Warrant dated April 8 shows that Detective Heffernan was investigating Parker but did not supply any legitimate evidence, citing only information which would have had a privacy interest for Parker in the cell phone of a non-arrested individual which was unlawfully seized. Private information stored inside the phone included Parker's email account with Backpage, provactive photos of Holliday, and text messages from Parker to Holliday. After reviewing the contents, it was a domino effect to Parker's arrest with a firearm. The contents from that warrantless seizure of Parker's private affairs was used to convict him of multiple criminal offenses.

The essence of the constitutional provision prohibiting

unlawful searches and seizures is not merely that evidence so acquired may not be used before a court, but that it shall not be used at all. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 485.

When Detective Heffernan was asked if he had subpoensed Parker's email account to retrieve his private information, he stated that he had not. See RP, Appendix 3, pg. 997 at 17-18.

In <u>United States v. Forrester</u>, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that a person has a privacy interest in the content of email in the same manner that a person has a reasonable privacy interest in physical mail.

Here, there is evidence that even though the phone did not initially belong to Parker, his private affairs, such as his email account and text messages, were stored inside. This evidence shows that Parker exercised a privacy interest in the cell phone despite not owning it, and that he had a constructive possession of the phone.

If a defendant is able to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or property seized, then he has satisfied the Standing requirement under a Fourth Amendment analysis and does not need to rely on automatic standing. State v. Kypreos, 110 Wn.App. 662, 39 P.3d 371 (2000).

As a general rule, the rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal rights, which may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure. Thus, a defendant generally may challenge a search or seizure only if he or she has a personal Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the area searched or the property seized. The defendant must personally claim a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action. State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 175, 181, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).

The court erred when it stated Parker lacks standing citing State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002), for a cell phone that was unlawfully seized which contained a wealth of Parker's private affairs.

However, in State v. Carter, 127 Wash.2d 836, 841, 904 P.2d 240 (1995), the Court held that a defendant who lacks automatic standing may still possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the thing seized, and on that basis be able to challenge the search or seizure. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-87, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2549-50, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980).

Mr. Parker had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Ms. Holliday's cell phone that was unlawfully seized as evidence under the Federal and State Constitution.

Admission of evidence obtained in violation of either the Federal or State Constitution is an error of constitutional magnitude. State v. Contreras, 92 Wn.App. 307, 318, 466 P.2d 915 (1998)(citing State v. Micrz, 72 Wn.App. 783, 866 P.2d 65 (1994)).

The Fourth Amendment secures "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment protects reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). The Fourth Amendment protects "people, not place," Id at Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and evidence derived from it (such as human trafficking, assaults, possession of a firearm, promoting prostitution, kidnapping, burglary), must be suppressed as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-87, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. McClendon, 713 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2013) ("Searches and seizures that offend the Fourth Amendment are unlawful and evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result of such invasions is considered 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.")(citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-87).

#### Unlawful Seizure Not Cured

The Court erred stating that an unlawful seizure can be cured by a subsequent warrant.

On April 4, 2013, when Ms. Holiday was detained, police were interested in detaining her to target and investigate Mr. Parker. Detective Heffernan "took her cell phone" and the contents of the cell phone included Parker's text messages and email account with Backpage ads for the purpose of using them as evidence against Mr. Parker.

However, Holliday was not arrested on April 4 or detained for prostitution. There was no consent from Holliday or Parker when the officer intruded into their private affairs when he unlawfully seized the phone. Then, Officer Heffernan waited four days, until April 8, 2013, to apply for a warrant. He stated that he "took the cell phone from a non-arrested individual." See Appendix 3, Complaint for Search Warrant, dated April 8, 2013, pg. 7, and Complaint for Search Warrant dated April 23, 2013, pg. 4.

The discovery of a warrant cannot by itself dissipate the taint of an initial illegality, because such a per se rule could "'create a new form of police investigation' by routinely illegally seizing individuals, knowing that the subsequent discovery of a warrant would provide after-the-fact justification for illegal conduct." State v. Hummons,

227 Ariz.78, 253 P.3d 275, 278 (2011) (quoting <u>United</u>

<u>States v. Gross</u>, 624 F.3d 309, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2010).

Treating a warrant as an intervening circumstance poses a potential for abuse, and exclusion of the evidence acts as a deterrent to such conduct.

For example, in <u>State v. Dimmick</u>, 248 Or.App. 167, 273 P.3d 212 (2012), Dimmick appealed his convictions of four counts of unlawful delivery of methamphetamine, and three counts of unlawful possession of methamphetamine. He argued that the trial court erred in failing to suppress a backpack and its contents, which he argued were unlawfully seized during a traffic stop.

The Oregon Court of Appeals found:

The state, as noted above, contends that the backpack was not searched pursuant to an inventory policy, but pursuant to a warrant—that is, that the search warrant rendered the prior illegal seizure so attenuated from the discovery of evidence that no suppression was necessary. [cite ommitted] We disagree. If a defendant meets the burden of establishing a "factual nexus" between the unlawful police conduct and the challenged evidence, then the burden of persuasion shifts to the state to prove that the evidence was not tainted by the unlawful conduct. Here, there is a factual nexus between the unlawful seizure and the subsequent search warrant. The backpack would not have been in the police's possession but for the unlawful seizure.

#### Dimmick, 273 P.3d at 217-18.

In <u>Dimmick</u>, the prosecutor argued that the officer did not search the backpack pursuant to an inventory policy, but rather, that police searched the backpack pursuant to a

search warrant. The Court in <u>Dimmick</u> rejected that argument. The Court concluded that the backpack was never lawfully seized. The Court reversed and remanded the conviction to which the backpack related. <u>Dimmick</u>, 273 P.3d at 216.

In the Parker case there is a factual nexus between the unlawful seizure and the subsequent search warrant. The cell phone would not have been in the police's possession but for the unlawful seizure. Thus, the trial court erred in admitting Parker's private affairs (email account and text messages) as evidence at trial. This Court is asked to so hold.

The constitutional requirement that searches and seizures be made only pursuant to 'authority of law' is complied with where such searches and seizures are made incident to a lawful arrest. Thus it is the general rule that, where a person is legally arrested, the arresting officer has a right to search such person and take from his possession money or goods which the officer reasonably believes to be connected with the supposed crime, and discoveries made in this lawful search may be shown as evidence at trial. State v. Micheals, 60 Wn.2d at 643. Here, on April 4, there was neither crime of prostitution, nor was Holliday arrested, nor did Parker or Holliday consent to the seizure of the phone. As Officer Heffernan

state, he "took the phone." Id. at 7.

If the evidence was seized without authority of law, it is not admissible in court. We suppress evidence not to punish the police, who may easily have erred innocently. We suppress unlawfully seized evidence because we do not want to become knowingly complicit in an unconstitutional exercise of power. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928)(Brandeis, J. dissenting); State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 894.

"reasonable or unreasonable." Instead, it requires 'authority of law' before the State may pry into the private affairs of individuals. Our constitution protects legitimate expectations of privacy: "those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, save from government trespass absent a warrant." State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 511.

When an unconstitutional search or seizure occurs, all subsequently uncovered evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and should be suppressed. State v. Magneson, 107 Wn.App. at 227, 26 P.3d 986 (2001).

#### Fourth Amendment Particularity Requirement

The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants "particularly describe the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized." <u>U.S.Const.</u>, Amend. IV. As this court has explained, "The purposes of the search warrant particularity requirement are the prevention of general searches, prevention of the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the issuing magistrate's authorization, and prevention of the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact." State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 545.

As to the second purpose underlying the particularity requirement, conformance with the requirement eliminates the danger of unlimited discretion in the executing officer's determination of what to seize. United States v. Blakency, 942 F.2d 1001, 1026 (6th Cir.). In Parker's case there are three warrants, one dated April 8, 2013, and two others dated April 23, 2013. These three warrants are overly broad where it states the following: "All information stored in the above described cellular phone that can be extracted through a forensic examination."

Appendix 3, April 8, pg. 8, and April 23, pg. 8.

Also, there is no particularity in the described items to be seized: "Not limited to images, video, contacts, conspirator phone numbers, address, text messages, email messages, ledgers, financial transactions, electronic documents." This broad language and general descriptions granted the officer executing the warrant too much

discretion as to what to seize, rather than to a judge.

The Fourth Amendment requires that for a warrant to be valid it must "particularly descibe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.

Const., Amend. IV. This particularity requirement makes general searches under a warrant impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d at 1472 (9th Cir. 1986).

Even where the Constitution requires scrupulous exactitude, search warrants are tested and interpret in a common sense, practical manner rather than in a hypertechnical sense. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 549. However, neither common sense nor particularity allows the court to assume there are limitations on a warrant's scope where such limitations are plainly absent. There, these warrant's rote citation to Human Trafficking, Promoting Prostitution, and Prostitution statutes, is at best ambiguous as to whether it limits the subsequent list of items to be seized. Because that ambiguity means that officers, rather than judges, will decide the scope, it fails not just Perrone, but the core purpose of the historically grounded particularity requirement. See Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485-86.

Here the person, Parker, subject to the search does not know what the officer may or may not seize. Due to the broad language where the warrant states: "All information stored in the above-described cellular phone that can be extracted through forensic examination or other means..."

These warrants fail to inform the person subject to the search what items the officers were authorized to seize.

In <u>Riley</u>, the purpose of a warrant is not only to limit the executing officer's discretion, but to inform the person subject to the search what items the officer may seize. <u>State v. Riley</u>, 121 Wn.2d at 29-30 (1993), <u>United States v. Hayes</u>, 794 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th Cir. 1986).

When the material to be seized pursuant to a search warrant is Human Trafficking, Promoting Prostitution, but the party seeking the warrant cannot identify the specific items, the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment can be satisfied by limiting the items subject to seizure by stating specifically in the warrant the type of material that qualifies as Human Trafficking and Promoting Prostitution.

As the Court held in <u>Perrone</u>, using statutory language to describe the materials sought would likely make the warrant sufficiently particular. But the inclusion of the citation to the statute at the top of this warrant did nothing to make these warrants more particular. Not only

did it fail to add helpful information—such as the definitions of Human Trafficking and Promoting Prostitution—it also did not modify or limit the evidence the officer could seize. State v. Besola, 184 Wn.2d at 615, 359 P.3d 779 (2015); State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 554.

There is no probable cause for the items in the cellular phone, such as images, video, contacts, conspirator phone numbers, address, text messages, email messages, ledges, financial transactions, or electronic documents. This is a general description of items that does not specifically relate to the crimes of Human Trafficking and Promoting Prostitution. "There is no particularity to describe the items to be seized."

Thus, a warrant is overbroad if it fails to describe with particularity items for which probable cause exists, or because it describes, particularly or otherwise, items for which probable cause does not exist. State v. Maddox, 116 Wn.App. 805, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003).

As to prevention of general searches, "the specific evil is the 'general warrant' abhorred by the colonists..."

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 29 L.Ed.2d

564, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971).

Officer seized lawfully possessed images, such as family pictures, pictures with friends. See Appendix 9, Private Information.

General warrants, of course, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. "This problem posed by the general warrant is not that of intrusion per se, but the general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings... The Fourth Amendment addresses the problem by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized."

Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 49 L.Ed.2d 627, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976)(quoting Coolidge at 467); see also LoJ. Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920, 99 S.Ct. 2319 (1979); State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 545.

Where a search warrant is found to be an unconstitutionally general warrant, the invalidity due to unlimited language of the warrant taints all items seized without regard to whether they were specifically named in the warrant. State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 557.

Here, the officer was able to intrude into private communication (text messages) of all the individuals listed on the phone because the warrant does not specify which person's text messages were to be seized. This is an unconstitutional violation of Parker's rights under the Fourth Amendment and First Amendment.

Warrants for materials protected by the First

Amendment require a heightened degree of particularity.

State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 547-48 (quoting Stanford,

379 U.S at 485).

Applying the severance doctrine would be utterly inconsistent with the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Here is an overbroad warrant vesting too much discretion in the executing officer, and is so broad as to authorize general searches of private communication (text messages) protected by the First Amendment. The executing officer was allowed to rummage through virtually all the cellular phones with absolutely no meaningful guidelines as to what was seizeable.

Because these warrants are overbroad and fail to meet the Fourth Amendment Particularity Requirement, any evidence obtained must be suppressed, and convictions for Human Trafficking and Promoting Prostitution reversed.

#### CONCLUSION

Since Petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his email and text messages, and since police seized the cell phone without the authority of a legal warrant, the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained as a direct result of violating Petitioner's right to privacy under both Washington Constitution Article 1, Section 7, and United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment. This evidence includes Parker's personal and private affairs as well as evidence of possession of a firearm and other criminal offenses. the unlawful seizure on April 4, there is no basis upon which Petitioner's convictions would be supported. Therefore, this Court should reverse Petitioner's convictions and remand with instructions to grant his motion to suppress.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of March, 2018.

Anthony D. Parker, #776122

Stafford Creek Corr. Ctr.

191 Constantine Way Aberdeen, WA

# APPENDIX #1

# IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,	) No. 73667-1-l
Respondent, v.	ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD
ANTHONY DEWAYNE PARKER,	) )
Petitioner.	) ) )

The State has moved to supplement the record with certain exhibits. We have not seen any response to this motion from appointed counsel for Anthony Parker.

On October 19, 2015, this court filed its decision in Parker's appeal of his judgment and sentence. We affirmed. In the consolidated personal restraint petition, we dismissed the petition except for one claim. That claim was that there was an illegal search and seizure of the cell phone of another person to whom Parker allegedly sent text messages. For that claim only, we transferred the petition to the superior court for appointment of counsel to represent Parker. Consistent with these instructions, Parker is now represented.

In accordance with our further instructions, the superior court conducted a reference hearing solely on the one claim we referred to that court. Thereafter, that court entered its Findings of Fact on Reference Hearing dated January 30, 2017. We have reviewed these findings and other material submitted to this court after the reference hearing.

Based on our review, and being duly advised, this court hereby

ORDERS that the superior court shall make its determination on the merits of Parker's claim that there was an illegal search and seizure of the cell phone of another that underlies his claim for relief. Pursuant to RAP 16.12 and the other Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court shall make its findings and conclusions with respect to that claim. In sum, the superior court shall make a full determination on the merits of this claim based on this revised instruction.

This court further

ORDERS that, in view of the revised instruction to the superior court, the State's Motion to Supplement Record dated February 28, 2017 is denied without prejudice.

Dated this 31st day of Morch 2017.

COX, J.

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# APPENDIX #2

#### RECEIVED FOR FILING KITSAP COUNTY CLERK NOV 13 2017 ALISON H. SONNTAG

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KITSAP COUNTY

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

v.

Plaintiff.

No. 13-1-00597-1

ANTHONY DEWAYNE PARKER.

Defendant.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON REFERENCE HEARING AND ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court for a reference hearing ordered by the Court of Appeals in *State v. Parker*, Court of Appeals No. 73667-1-I. This Court is charged with making a determination on the merits of Defendant Parker's personal restraint petition claim that there was an illegal search and seizure of the cell phone of another that underlies his claim for relief.

#### PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 26, 2013, a jury found Defendant Parker guilty of multiple counts of assault, human trafficking, promoting prostitution, burglary, kidnapping, unlawful possession of a firearm, witness tampering, and firearm enhancements. On January 14, 2014, he was sentenced to a total confinement of 601 months. Parker filed a direct appeal of his judgment and sentence on numerous grounds, which was denied by the Court of Appeals on October 19, 2015. However, in the same opinion, the Court of Appeals found that Parker's consolidated personal restraint petition contained one claim that required further consideration—whether there was an illegal search and seizure of another's cell phones, violating Parker's privacy rights in his messages on those cell phones. The Court of Appeals transferred the petition back to this Court for the appointment of counsel and for a reference

hearing as to the alleged illegal search and seizure issue only, and otherwise dismissed the petition:

On the present record and the present status of briefing, we are unable to determine whether Parker is entitled to relief. Accordingly, we transfer the petition to the superior court for appointment of counsel, a reference hearing, and findings of fact. The findings shall be transmitted to this court for further action.

The superior court's findings of fact should include, without limitation:

- 1. A specification of all evidence on J.H.'s cell phones to which Parker's asserted privacy interest extended;
- 2. Whether such evidence was admitted at trial; and
- 3. If not admitted, whether such evidence led to other evidence that was admitted at trial.
- 4. A specification of what evidence admitted at trial, independent of that listed in paragraphs 1 to 3, supported Parker's convictions.

We affirm Parker's judgment and sentence for the direct appeal. We dismiss his personal restraint petition to the extent of all claims except for the illegal search and seizure claim. With respect to that claim, we transfer the petition to the superior court for appointment of counsel and a reference hearing on that claim only. Thereafter, the court shall enter findings of fact and transmit them to this court for further action, all pursuant to RAP 16.12.

Attorney Peter Connick was appointed to represent Parker at the reference hearing which was held January 30, 2017. That same day, the Court entered Findings of Fact, which were transmitted to the court of appeals for further action. Based upon those findings, the Court of Appeals issued an Order on March 31, 2017, remanding the matter back to this Court, and directing that

the superior court shall make its determination on the merits of Parker's claim that there was an illegal search and seizure of the cell phone of another that underlies his claim for relief. Pursuant to RAP 16.12 and the other Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court shall make its findings and conclusions with respect to that claim. In sum, the superior court shall make a full determination on the merits of this claim based on this revised instruction.

This Court thereupon issued a briefing order and set a hearing on the merits of Parker's claim of an illegal search and seizure of Johanna Holliday's ("Holliday") cell

phones for November 6, 2017. Briefing was provided by the parties and the hearing was held as scheduled.<sup>1</sup>

#### **ANALYSIS**

In its analysis of Parker's claim, the Court incorporates by reference the Findings of Fact entered January 30, 2017. Two phones were seized from Holliday, on two different days, with both containing text messages from Parker that were later admitted as evidence at Parker's trial. Parker claims that there was an illegal search and seizure of Holliday's phones that underlies his claim for relief. To support this argument, Defendant relies upon *State v. Hinton*, 179 Wn.2d 862, 319 P.3d 9 (2014). In *Hinton*, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a "text message conversation was a private affair protected by the state constitution from warrantless intrusion." *Id.* at 865.

The cell phones in question in this case were seized from Holliday on April 4, 2013 ("ZTE")<sup>2</sup> and on April 12, 2013 ("Motorola")<sup>3</sup>. Defendant argues that the ZTE phone was illegally seized as the result of an illegal pretextual stop and that the warrant for the search of the phone lacked the required particularity. Defendant contends that the search of the ZTE phone led to a sting operation resulting in the arrest of Holliday and the seizure of the Motorola phone, and thus, the Motorola phone and any evidence collected from it must also be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Hinton makes clear that a defendant has a privacy interest in the text messages sent to another person's phone, but its analysis does not extend to the privacy interest in the phone itself. To challenge seizure of either phone, Parker must establish that he has standing to challenge the seizure. Under *State v. Jones*, 146 Wn.2d 328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002), to claim automatic standing, a defendant (1) must be charged with an offense that involves possession as an essential element; and (2) must be in possession of the subject matter at the time of the search or seizure. Because Parker meets neither of these requirements, he lacks standing to challenge the seizure of Holliday's phones.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> At the hearing, the State provided proposed "Conclusions of Law on Reference Hearing and Order Denying PRP." The Court provided Defendant an opportunity to provide his own proposed order, which was received November 10, 2017.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Admitted as Trial Exhibit 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Admitted as Trial Exhibit 13.

Because Parker lacks standing to challenge the seizure of either the ZTE phone or the Motorola phone, Parker may only challenge the search of the phones. The challenge to the search of the phones, which resulted in the discovery of his texts, fails as a warrant based upon probable cause was properly obtained for the ZTE and the Motorola phones on April 8, 2013 and April 23, 2013 respectively, before the search of the phones was conducted. Parker's contention that the warrant application for the ZTE was insufficient is without merit, as the affidavit submitted by the detective was not based on generalizations, it provided extensive factual information, was specific as to the information being sought, and explicitly tied the criminal activity to the phone sought to be searched. Because the police did not search either of the phones prior to properly obtaining a warrant, Parker's privacy rights under *Hinton* were not violated by the search of the ZTE phone and the Motorola phone, and any other evidence obtained by the search of the ZTE phone is not suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.<sup>4</sup>

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the evidence obtained pursuant to search within Holliday's cellphones is not suppressed based upon Parker's claim that his privacy rights were violated by the illegal search and seizure of another's cell phone. Further, to the extent that this Court is called upon to determine Parker's PRP based upon his claim of illegal search and seizure, the PRP is hereby **DENIED**.

Dated: This  $\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2}$  day of November, 2017.

JUDGE LEILA MILLS

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Because Parker lacks standing to challenge the seizure of the ZTE phone the Court does not reach the issue of whether to April 4th stop of Holliday was an illegal pretextual stop.

## DECLARATION OF MAILING

I, Marcus Hauer, certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that I am now and at all times herein mentioned, a resident of the State of Washington, over the age of eighteen years, not a party to or interested in the above-entitled action, and competent to be a witness herein.

Today, I caused a copy of the foregoing document to be served in the manner noted on the following:

Randall Sutton	
Kitsap Co Prosecutor's Office	│ ☑ Via U.S. Mail
614 Division St., MS-35	☐ Via Email: rsutton@co.kitsap.wa.us
Port Orchard, WA 98366-4614	
Peter Connick	☐ Via U.S. Mail
12351 Lake City Way NE Ste 203	Via Email:
Seattle, WA 98125-5437	peterconnick@gmail.com

DATED this November 13, 2017 at Port Orchard, Washington.

Marcus Hauer Staff Attorney

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

## APPENDIX #3



## IN THE KITSAP COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

2 State of Washington. ) No: 20130160 3 4 Plaintiff. COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH v. 5 ) WARRANT FOR FRUITS / 6 BLACK ZTE CELLULAR PHONE MODEL Z431, S/N) INSTRUMENTALITIES AND / OR 322423142390, BEING STORED IN THE ) EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME OF RCW Bremerton Police Department's secure ) 9A.40.100 Human Trafficking, RCW EVIDENCE LOCKER IN THE CITY OF BREMERTON. ) 9A.88.080 Promoting Prostitution and/or COUNTY OF KITSAP, STATE OF WASHINGTON. ) RCW 9A.88.030 Prostitution Defendant.

I, DETECTIVE RYAN HEFFERNAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and sa I am a duly appointed, qualified, and acting detective assigned to the Bremerton Police Department's Special Operations Group (SOG), and am charged with responsibility for the investigation of criminal activity occurring within Kitsap County. I have probable cause to believe, and do, in fact, believe, that in violation of the laws of the State of Washington with respect to RCW 9A.40.100 Human Trafficking, RCW 9A.88.080 Promoting Prostitution and/or RCW 9A.88.030 Prostitution, evidence and/or fruits and/or instrumentalities of said offense(s) are presently being kept, stored or possessed, and can be located and seized in the above-described cellular phone. My belief being based upon information acquired through personal interviews with witnesses and other law enforcement officers, review of reports and personal observations, said information being as further described herein-

I have been employed as a police officer by the City of Bremerton Police Department since July 2006. I have been a SOG Detective since September 2011. Prior to becoming a police officer, I served as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Alaska. I received a BA with honors from Lafayette College (1998), and a JD from Rutgers School of Law (2002).

In July 2006, I attended 720 hours of training at the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Center in Burien, Washington. There, I received 14-hours of basic narcotics training.

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT: Page 1



Russell D. Hauge, Prosecuting Attorney Adult Criminal and Administrative Divisions 614 Division Street, MS-35 Port Orchard, WA 98366-4681 (360) 337-7174; Fax (360) 337-4949

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The training included instruction in drug and drug paraphernalia identification, as well as identifying impairment indicators associated with specific drug use. Instruction pertained to each of the seven categories of drugs: depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, phencyclidine and narcotic analgesics.

In February of 2010 I attended an 80-hour basic drug enforcement class presented by the Drug Enforcement Administration. The training included, but was not limited to the following: pharmacology/drug ID, electronic narcotics' investigation, criminal interdiction, tactical entries and surveillance procedures

In September 2010 I attended a 24-hour methamphetamine investigations course presented by the Midwest Counterdrug Training Center. The training pertained to methamphetamine lab identification, and considerations for writing and executing methamphetamine related search warrants.

In November 2012, I attended 20 hours of training through the California Narcotics Officers Association (CNOA). The course topics included instruction on informant management, search and seizure issues, controlled buy and buy-bust operations, and undercover officer survival.

During my law enforcement career, I have participated in multiple narcotics investigations, which have resulted in arrests and seizures of various controlled substances including Marijuana, Cocaine, Methamphetamine, Black Tar Heroin, Ecstasy, Molly and Ketamine. Through these investigations and discussions with other experienced law enforcement agents, I have become familiar with the methods of packaging illegal narcotics, values of illegal narcotics, and terms associated with the manufacture, distribution and use of these substances. I have been an affiant for approximately 25 narcotics related search warrants, and participated in the execution of narcotics related search warrants that have resulted in arrests, and the discovery of illegal narcotics and items related to the use, packaging, distribution, and manufacturing of these substances.

In addition to narcotics related crimes, I have participated in investigations pertaining to prostitution. Through the course of these investigations, I have interviewed numerous prostitutes and pimps. I have found through my training and experience that these investigations often overlap with drug investigations. Specifically, I have learned that those individuals who promote

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 2



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prostitution, commonly referred to as pimps, sometimes use drugs as a means to maintain control over prostitutes. It is common for those individuals who promote prostitution to pay prostitutes with drugs, and withhold drugs when they are dissatisfied with performance. Pimps will often utilize well established prostitutes to mentor new prostitutes, and facilitate their transition into the illicit activity. I also know that pimps and prostitutes will often utilize internet websites such as tnaboard.com and backpage.com to advertise for prostitution. Pimps and prostitutes will often use their cellular phones to post ads on these websites, and communicate with clients and each other about their illicit activities.

I also know that people engaged in prostitution perform their services either in a fixed location that they designate, such as a motel room, or in a location determined by the client. This distinction is commonly referred to as an "in" or "out" call. Because of the inherent dangers associated with prostitution, pimps or their agents will often drive prostitutes to out calls and remain in the area during the encounter. This practice provides a degree of perceived protection for the prostitute, and allows the pimp to immediately be paid for the service. In addition to driving their prostitutes to specific locations for out calls, I know from my training and experience that pimps often use their vehicles as a private meeting locations to discuss their criminal business enterprises, which often extend beyond promoting prostitution.

This affidavit is made in support of an application for a search warrant for the cellular telephone described as follows:

BLACK ZTE CELLULAR PHONE MODEL Z431, S/N 322423142390, BEING STORED IN THE BREMERTON POLICE DEPARTMENT'S SECURE EVIDENCE LOCKER IN THE CITY OF BREMERTON, COUNTY OF KITSAP, STATE OF WASHINGTON

PROBABLE CAUSE: Over the course of the past several months, SOG detectives have investigated a human trafficking operation led by Anthony D Parker (6/15/79) and his former girlfriend, Lorena A Llamas (5/31/84). Llamas has been incarcerated in Kitsap County Jail since November 17, 2012. While there, Llamas has groomed inmates to work as prostitutes, and sent them out to work for Parker. Detectives identified one of these prostitutes as Johanna Holliday. Holliday used her black ZTE cellular phone model Z431, S/N 322423142390 (hereinafter referred to as the "Phone") to communicate with Llamas, Parker and clients about prostitution activities. Holliday may have also used the Phone to advertise prostitution services on

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 3



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backpage.com between December 2012 and April 2013. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that evidence of human trafficking, promoting prostitution and/or prostitution will be found in the Phone, which is currently be stored in the Bremerton Police Department's secure evidence room.

Over the past several months, detectives reviewed jail phone calls that Llamas made to Parker and Holliday. All of the calls to Holliday were made to (360) 908-2471, the number associated with the Phone. The number is listed for Holliday in the jail's intelmate record database. Holliday confirmed that the number is associated with the Phone. I have called the Phone, and confirmed that the number matches it.

During jail calls, Holliday openly discusses her prostitution activities with Llamas. Holliday tells Llamas that she (Holliday) is staying at Parker's residence, "posting" and taking calls. I know from my training and experience that the term posting refers to placing advertisements for prostitution on various websites. Through my investigation, I learned that Holliday posts ads on backpage.com.

In one instance, Holliday tells Llamas that that she (Holliday) had intercourse with a customer after giving him a hand-job with lotion. Holliday acquired a rash, and had to go to the store with Parker to buy medicated douche. In another phone call, Holliday discusses her relationship with an Asian prostitute working for Parker. Holliday states that Parker views her (Holliday) as the "top bitch" and instructed her (Holliday) to "check the Asian bitch." I reviewed a backpage.com ad featuring Holliday and an Asian female, who I identified through a review of available police databases as Ranicia J Camacho (5/19/86). The ad states, "two girl special -sexxy blonde and hot Asian!!" Detectives interviewed Camacho, who confirmed that Holliday worked as a prostitute. Camacho told detectives that she forwarded her photos to Holliday's Phone, which Holliday then posted on backpage.com. Camacho believed that Holliday used the Phone to post the ads. The backpage.com ad featuring Camacho and Holliday lists Parker's phone number; however the majority of Holliday's ads list the number associated with her Phone.

On 1/23/13, Parker tells Llamas that he assaulted "Baby Doll." Through the course of my investigation, I learned that Baby Doll is a moniker used by Holliday. Parker says that Holliday has been "stealing shit . . . money and drugs." Parker states that Holliday "ain't going anywhere unless she wants her other eye shut up." Llamas asks Parker if he (Parker) already hit Holliday,

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 4



 and then says something like, "Of course you did." During a phone call on 2/2/13, Holliday describes the assault in detail. Holliday tells Llamas that Parker picked her up by the hair, threw her against a wall, ripped out a chunk of her hair and gave her a black eye. Holliday says that she "pissed herself twice" during the assault. I later spoke with a witness, who corroborated Holliday's account of events.

On or around 2/11/13 Parker was arrested for burglary and an outstanding DOC warrant. He (Parker) immediately calls Holliday on the Phone, and tells her, "You need to follow my orders . . . what the fuck I tell you from right now until I get the fuck out of here in three days." Parker also cautions Holliday that that "[her] money better be right when [he] gets out." Parker instructs Holliday to help with his bail saying, "Take that little bit of chump change that you fucking got and give it to Jaccet." I know that Jaccet is the moniker used by Tyler F Williams (1/26/76), a well-known local gang member. When Holliday starts to sob, Parker says, "I don't want to hear any crying bitch. . . . stop crying nigga, I want someone to be making fucking moves." During telephone calls during this time period with Llamas, Holliday says that Parker keeps all of her money, and she (Holliday) is taking the opportunity while Parker is in jail to make money for herself.

On 2/12/13, Holliday speaks with Llamas, and says that she cannot talk because she (Holliday) is in the middle of a call. At the same time, Detective Rauback drove by Holliday's residence, and observed a male, later identified as Jonathan Miller, talking on his cell phone in the yard. Detective Rauback had observed Miller parked in the area earlier. I later contacted Miller, who confirmed that he had been at the residence to meet with Holliday. Miller, who recognized Holliday from a photo, told me that he had found Holliday's advertisement on backpage.com, and called her by phone to arrange for an erotic massage.

On 2/19/13, detectives posed as a potential customer, and sent Holliday a text message to the Phone asking if she was available for a call. Holliday, who had recently posted a new ad on backpage.com, corresponded with detectives to arrange a meeting. Detectives asked Holliday to meet at a local hotel. Holliday refused, stating that she does not do hotels. Holliday stated that she wanted to meet at a house. Holliday eventually stopped communicating with detectives. Following the failed meeting, Holliday continued to post new ads on backpage.com with the same phone number.

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 5



On 2/22/13, detectives applied for a search warrant for Holliday's backpage.com ads. Kitsap County Superior Court Judge Jennifer Forbes issued the warrant. Detectives obtained the customer, and billing information underlying the ads which lists both Parker and Holliday's phone numbers as well as various addresses associated with both subjects.

On 3/13/13, detectives applied for a search warrant for Holliday's phone records related to the number (360) 908-2471. Kitsap County Superior Court Judge Jennifer Forbes issued the warrant, which was served on AT&T on or around 3/14/13. As of this date, AT&T has not responded to the warrant.

On 4/3/13, Parker was placed into custody on an outstanding DOC warrant. Parker calls the Phone numerous times, and gives Holliday instructions on what she needs to do while he is in custody. Holliday discusses some of her clients, and money that she is making through prostitution and saving for Parker. Parkers tells Holliday, "I need you to do what the fuck I say to a T... Just do what you're supposed to do and stack." I know from my training and experience that "stack" means to save money. Parker talks about using the money to purchase a vehicle, and pay off debt that he owes for bail from a prior arrest. Parker also tells Holliday to take "Monster" from underneath the mattress, and put him in a duffle-bag in the shed. I know from conversations with Jaccet associates that Parker is in possession of a handgun, which was stolen and recently returned to him. I believe that "Monster" is a reference to the gun.

On 4/4/13 at approximately 1900, Detective Rauback advised me that he had observed Holliday and Alisia Crettol meeting with Travier Stevenson (AKA Little Jaccet). Stevenson is a gang member who uses, and sells Percocet pills. Detective Rauback observed Holliday meet briefly with Stevenson inside a Ford P/U truck WA license A37747M. The vehicle is registered to Stevenson's girlfriend, Janee Morgan. Holliday then returned to Crettol's vehicle, a blue Ford Escort WA license AEH1175. The meeting occurred in the area of the A&C Tavern on Perry Ave. Detective Rauback followed Crettol away from the area, and coordinated with patrol officers to stop the vehicle in the area of 16<sup>th</sup> St and Warren Ave.

I responded to the location of the stop, and stood by while Holliday and Crettol were detained in properly fitting, and double-locked restraints. I escorted Holliday to a patrol vehicle, and explained that I was investigating a possible drug transaction that had just occurred as well as other crimes related to prostitution. I read Holliday her Miranda rights from a department issued

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 61



card. Holliday acknowledged her rights, and agreed to speak with me.

I asked Holliday how many pills she had just gotten from Stevenson. Holliday was hesitant to answer, and mumbled something that I could not understand. I told Holliday that an undercover detective had observed the transaction, and asked her again how many pills she had gotten from Stevenson. Holliday told me that she had gotten one pill from him. I asked Holliday where she had put the pill. Holliday told me that she had put it inside her purse, which was sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle. I asked Holliday for consent to retrieve the pill, and she agreed to same. It should be noted that Crettol also agreed to a search of the vehicle, and confirmed that the purse belonged to Holliday. I went to the vehicle, and withdrew the purse as well as the Phone from the passenger seat. Crettol was present, and confirmed that the Phone belonged to Holliday.

I returned with the items to Holliday, and took off her hand restraints. Holliday located the pill – small, round blue pill marked A 215 – inside her purse as well as a crumpled up piece of foil. Holliday handed both items over to me. I know from my training and experience that pill users will often smoke pills on foil as a means to bypass the chemical binders in the pills, resulting in an immediate and intense high. I showed Holliday the Phone located on the passenger seat. Holliday told me that it was her Phone, and identified the number as (360) 908-2471. I called the number, confirming same. I took custody of the Phone.

Because Holliday was cooperative throughout the interview and agreed to meet with detectives the following day to make a recorded statement regarding her criminal activities, she was released from custody. I placed the Phone into a secure evidence locker with the intent to either examine it with Holliday's consent the following day, or if necessary apply for a search warrant. I placed the pill, and foil into evidence in accordance with department procedure. Through a search of drugs.com, I identified the pill as 30 mg Oxycodone Hydrochloride, a schedule II narcotic.

On 4/5/13, Holliday failed to show up for her interview. She has not contacted detectives, and her whereabouts are unknown.

Based upon the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe that evidence of human trafficking, promoting prostitution and/or prostitution will be found in Holliday's Phone. I respectfully request that the court issue a search warrant allowing law enforcement to search and

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 7



seize the following information:

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 All information stored in the above-described cellular phone that can be extracted through a forensic examination, or other means including, but not limited to images, video, contacts, conspirator phone numbers/addresses, text messages, email messages, ledgers, financial transaction information, electronic documents, or any other stored information relating to human trafficking, promoting prostitution and/or prostitution.

> DETECTIVE RYAN HEFFERNAN Bremerton Police Department

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

\_ day of \_

1,2013.

Jydde

Distribution-Original (Court Clerk); 1 copy (Prosecutor), 1 copy (Detective)

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Russell D. Hauge, Prosecuting Attorney Adult Criminal and Administrative Divisions 614 Division Street, MS-35 Port Orchard, WA 98366-4681 (360) 337-7174; Fax (360) 337-4949

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 8

ADD FILED

IN THE KITSAP COUNTY SUPERIOR COUNTS

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STATE OF WASHINGTON,

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30 31 Plaintiff.

v.

BLACK MOTOROLA CELLULAR PHONE MODEL WX430, S/N 80DF5CC1 BEING STORED IN THE BREMERTON POLICE DEPARTMENT'S SECURE EVIDENCE ROOM AS ITEM #"JH" UNDER CASE NUMBER B13-001589 IN THE CITY OF BREMERTON, COUNTY OF KITSAP, STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Defendant.

) No. 20130179

) COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH
) WARRANT FOR FRUITS /
) INSTRUMENTALITIES AND / OR
) EVIDENCE OF THE CRIMES OF
) RCW 9A.40.100 Human Trafficking 1<sup>st</sup>
) Degree, RCW 9A.88.080 Promoting
) Prostitution 1<sup>st</sup> Degree and/or RCW
) 9A.88.030 Prostitution

I, DETECTIVE RYAN HEFFERNAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say—
I am a duly appointed, qualified, and acting detective assigned to the Bremerton Police Department's Special Operations Group (SOG), and am charged with responsibility for the investigation of criminal activity occurring within Kitsap County. I have probable cause to believe, and do, in fact, believe, that in violation of the laws of the State of Washington with respect to RCW 9A.40.100 Human Trafficking 1<sup>st</sup> Degree, RCW 9A.88.080 Promoting Prostitution 1<sup>st</sup> Degree and/or RCW 9A.88.030 Prostitution, evidence and/or fruits and/or instrumentalities of said offense(s) are presently being kept, stored or possessed, and can be located and seized in the above-described cellular phone. My belief being based upon information acquired through personal interviews with witnesses and other law enforcement officers, review of reports and personal observations, said information being as further described herein—

I have been employed as a police officer by the City of Bremerton Police Department since July 2006. I have been a SOG Detective since September 2011. Prior to becoming a police officer, I served as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Alaska. I received a BA with honors from Lafayette College (1998), and a JD from Rutgers School of Law (2002).

In July 2006, I attended 720 hours of training at the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Center in Burien, Washington. There, I received 14-hours of basic narcotics training.

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 1



The training included instruction in drug and drug paraphernalia identification, as well as identifying impairment indicators associated with specific drug use. Instruction pertained to each of the seven categories of drugs: depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, phencyclidine and narcotic analgesics.

In February of 2010 I attended an 80-hour basic drug enforcement class presented by the Drug Enforcement Administration. The training included, but was not limited to the following: pharmacology/drug ID, electronic narcotics' investigation, criminal interdiction, tactical entries and surveillance procedures

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In addition to narcotics related crimes, I have participated in investigations pertaining to prostitution. Through the course of these investigations, I have interviewed numerous prostitutes and pimps. I have found through my training and experience that these investigations often overlap with drug investigations. Specifically, I have learned that those individuals who promote

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 2



prostitution, commonly referred to as pimps, sometimes use drugs as a means to maintain control over prostitutes. It is common for those individuals who promote prostitution to pay prostitutes with drugs, and withhold drugs when they are dissatisfied with performance. Pimps will often utilize well established prostitutes to mentor new prostitutes, and facilitate their transition into the illicit activity. I also know that pimps and prostitutes will often utilize internet websites such as tnaboard.com and backpage.com to advertise for prostitution. Pimps and prostitutes will often use their cellular phones to post ads on these websites, and communicate with clients and each other about their illicit activities.

I also know that people engaged in prostitution perform their services either in a fixed location that they designate, such as a motel room, or in a location determined by the client. This distinction is commonly referred to as an "in" or "out" call. Because of the inherent dangers associated with prostitution, pimps or their agents will often drive prostitutes to out calls and remain in the area during the encounter. This practice provides a degree of perceived protection for the prostitute, and allows the pimp to immediately be paid for the service. In addition to driving their prostitutes to specific locations for out calls, I know from my training and experience that pimps often use their vehicles as a private meeting locations to discuss their criminal business enterprises, which often extend beyond promoting prostitution.

This affidavit is made in support of an application for a search warrant for the cellular telephone described as follows:

BLACK MOTOROLA CELLULAR PHONE MODEL WX430, S/N 80DF5CC1 BEING STORED IN THE BREMERTON POLICE DEPARTMENT'S SECURE EVIDENCE ROOM AS ITEM # "JH" UNDER CASE NUMBER B13-001589 IN THE CITY OF BREMERTON, COUNTY OF KITSAP, STATE OF WASHINGTON

PROBABLE CAUSE: Over the course of the last several months, SOG detectives have investigated the criminal activities of Anthony Parker (AKA Baby Deuce). Parker has an extensive criminal history including seven felony convictions, eleven gross misdemeanor convictions, three misdemeanor convictions and four "classification unknown" convictions. Through the course of the investigation, Detectives learned that Parker's former girlfriend, Lorena Llamas (AKA Crazy), groomed women to work as prostitutes for Parker while she (Llamas) was incarcerated in the Kitsap County jail. Detectives identified one of these prostitutes as Johanna Holliday. Holliday has no felony convictions, and five gross misdemeanor convictions

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 3



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30 31 for the following: Theft 3<sup>rd</sup> degree, Minor in Possession/Consumption (three counts) and DUI. As set forth below, Holliday used her black Motorola cellular phone model WX430, S/N 80FD5CC1 (hereinafter referred to as the "Phone") to communicate with Parker and clients about prostitution activities. There is probable cause to believe that evidence of human trafficking, promoting prostitution and/or prostitution will be found in the Phone, which is currently be stored in the Bremerton Police Department's secure evidence room.

Through a review of jail phone calls as well as contact with confidential informants and Jaccet associates, Detectives learned that Parker bailed Holliday out of jail in or around December 2012, and since that time has been involved in a dating relationship with Holliday and acted as her pimp. Detectives reviewed Holliday's ads for prostitution on backpage.com, which list phone numbers and addresses associated with Parker. Detectives performed surveillance, and confirmed that Holliday was living with Parker, and performing acts of prostitution at 1720 14th St in Bremerton Washington. The residence is believed to be owned by a family member of Llamas. Parker and Holliday have since moved to a residence at 703 S Summit Ave in Bremerton, Washington.

On 4/4/13, detectives observed Holliday participate in a drug transaction with Parker's associate, Travier Stevenson (AKA Little Jaccet). Detectives contacted Holliday on a traffic stop, and developed probable cause to arrest her for possession of a schedule II drug, Percocet. Holliday was in possession of a cellular phone, which detectives determined had been used to post advertisements for prostitution on backpage.com as well as to communicate with Parker and clients about prostitution. Detectives took of custody of the phone, and released Holliday.

On 4/8/13, detectives obtained a search warrant for Holliday's phone. Detectives examined the phone, which contained numerous text messages – many to Parker - pertaining to prostitution and drug activity. The phone also contained photos of Holliday that had been posted on backpage.com.

Upon her release, Holliday obtained a new phone and continued to post advertisements for prostitution on backpage.com listing the number (360) 551-9523. Detectives reviewed an advertisement Holliday posted on April 11th, 2013 at approximately 1828 hours. In that advertisement, Holliday posts six photographs of herself scantily-clad and in provocative poses. Her "screen name" on this advertisement is "Baby Doll."

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 4



 Using a texting application with a fictitious name and phone number, detectives contacted Holliday at the new number, and inquired if she was available. Holliday told detectives that she was available, advising that the cost was \$200 per hour. Holliday also provided pricing information for two girls - "125 per person," for each half hour and "200 each" for an hour. Holliday said that she was available to meet at the Oyster Bay Inn, and asked detectives to "grab some condoms" and "lube. Detectives met with Holliday, and placed her into custody for possession of a schedule II drug, Percocet, and an outstanding warrant. At the time of her arrest, Holliday was in possession of the above-described Phone, which is the subject of this warrant. Detectives believe that this is the Phone that she was using to respond to the backpage.com ad.

After being provided with her Miranda rights, Holliday agreed to speak with detectives. Holliday provided a taped statement, detailing her relationship with Llamas and Parker. Holliday confirmed that Parker has acted as her pimp and boyfriend since he bailed her out of jail approximately four months ago. Since that time, Holliday has lived with Parker and maintained a dating relationship with him. Holliday told detectives that Parker helped place her ads on backpage.com, responded to customers and kept nearly all of the money she made through prostitution. Parker saw it all as his money, and gave it out to Holliday as he saw fit. Although Parker was initially nice to Holliday and courted her as his girlfriend, he later forced her to work as a prostitute seven days a week, and left her alone for days at a time in the house demanding that she not spend time with her friends and family. Holliday told detectives that she lost everything she ever had — friends, family, possessions etc. over the last several months at the hands of Parker.

Holliday told detectives that she was terrified to leave Parker, and was isolated with nowhere else to go. When Holliday disobeyed Parker, he verbally abused her and often beat her severely. Detectives have reviewed numerous jail phone calls in which Parker berates Holliday, screaming, "You need to follow my orders . . . what the fuck I tell you from right now until I get the fuck out of here in three days." Parker also cautions Holliday that that "[her] money better be right when I get out." Parker instructs Holliday to help with his bail saying, "Take that little bit of chump change that you fucking got and give it to Jaccet." I know that Jaccet is the moniker used by Tyler Williams, the leader of the gang. When Holliday starts to sob, Parker says, "I don't want to hear any crying bitch. . . . stop crying nigga; I want someone to be making fucking moves."

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 5



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In addition to verbal abuse and threats, Holliday recounted numerous instances in which Parker assaulted, and imprisoned her in an effort to prevent her from leaving him. In one instance in or around the middle January, Parker became infuriated that Holliday had been with Anthony Flewellen, another Jaccet gang member and pimp. After scolding Holliday over the phone, Parker located Holliday at Flewellen's apartment at 901 Pleasant Ave in Bremerton. Parker came to the residence, and demanded to be let in. Jennifer Prerost, who was present at the residence with her (Prerost's) young daughter, allowed Parker inside the residence over Holliday's protests. Holliday huddled on the ground in Flewellen's locked bedroom. Parker came inside the residence, and broke down the bedroom door. Parker picked Holliday up off the ground by the hair, threw her against the wall and beat her face. Holliday was so terrified that she urinated in her pants. She later discovered large clumps of her hair missing. Detectives spoke to Prerost, who independently confirmed this account of events, telling detectives that it was one of the worst beatings she had ever witnessed. Detectives have also reviewed jail telephone calls, in which Parker tells Llamas that he beat Holliday for stealing from him. In addition, Detectives reviewed jail calls in which Holliday describes this portion of the assault in great detail to Llamas, who appeared more concerned about damage to the wall (Llamas mistakenly believed that the assault occurred in her residence).

Holliday told detectives that Parker took her from Flewellen's residence against her will to an unknown house on Houston Ave. Parker continued to beat Holliday about the head and face while in the car, which caused her to temporarily black out. Parker told Holliday that he planned to have his cousins tie her down, and torture her at the residence. Instead, Parker took Holliday inside and retrieved a towel for her to clean the blood from her face. Parker then drove Holliday back to 1720 14<sup>th</sup> St where he continued to abuse her for the next several hours.

At one point, Parker took a handgun and held it to Holliday's head asking if she was ready to die. Parker made Holliday look down the chamber of the gun, which he pointed directly at her face. Holliday broke down in tears as she told detectives that she was terrified for her life. Parker eventually put the gun away, but continued to torment Holliday for the next several days, periodically beating her and demanding that she continue to see clients despite having a black eye, significant bruising and limited function of one of her arms.

Although this was the worst beating that Parker inflicted on Holliday, it was far from the

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last. He continued to beat her, often for no reason, in an effort to maintain her as a prostitute under his control. Parker assaulted Holliday as recently as 4/12/13, crushing her cheek against the wall of their apartment with his fist. Parker applied such a degree of pressure that Holliday feared he would break bones in her face. Holiday said that Parker treated her like a piece of property, and made it clear that he could leave her at any time. He expected complete obedience from Holliday, saying that she needed to always be on point, and Holliday lived in constant fear of being assaulted, or possibly killed if she could not perform to his expectations.

Holliday spoke extensively about Parker's gun, which she described as a small handgun with a large light on the barrel. Holliday, who is not familiar with guns, noted that it was similar in appearance to a semi-automatic handgun carried by a detective. Holliday told detectives that Parker referred to the gun as "Monster", and usually kept it hidden under his mattress. Holliday confirmed that Parker took the gun to the couple's new residence on S Summit Ave. Holliday told detectives that Parker asked her to move the gun from under the mattress to a bag in the garage. Parker made the request in a phone call from the jail. Detectives reviewed the call which occurred on or around 4/3/13/in which Parker tells Holliday to move "Monster" from under the mattress to a duffel bag in the attached garage. Holliday told detectives that she followed Parkers instructions, and placed the gun in a blue Victoria Secret clothing bag in the garage.

On 4/12/13 Detectives applied for a telephonic search warrant for Parker's residence. The Honorable Kitsap County Judge Jennifer Forbes issued the warrant allowing law enforcement to enter the residence to effectuate the arrest of Parker, and search for the firearm.

On 4/13/13 at approximately 1200, detectives and patrol officers went to the residence to serve the warrant. Parker, who could be seen inside the residence, refused repeated demands to exit. Because of the severity of the crimes and safety concerns associated with the handgun, the SWAT team responded to the scene. Parker came out of the residence at approximately 1500, and was placed into custody. During a search of the residence, detectives located a confirmed stolen Taurus 45 caliber semi-automatic handgun S/N NBO91701 equipped with a light on the barrel in a clothing bag in the garage.

Detectives believe that evidence contained within the above-described Phone will further corroborate Holliday's criminal allegations. Holliday obtained the Phone after being placed into custody by detectives on 4/4/13, and used the Phone to communicate with clients about

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 7



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30 31 prostitution. Parker called Holliday on the Phone at the time of her arrest, and presumably sent Holliday text messages about prostitution, drugs and or other criminal activity as he had done on her previous phone. Based upon the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe that evidence of human trafficking 1<sup>st</sup> degree, promoting prostitution 1<sup>st</sup> degree and/or prostitution is currently being stored in the above-described Phone.

I respectfully request that the court issue a search warrant allowing law enforcement to search and seize the following information from the Phone:

1. All information stored in the above-described cellular phone that can be extracted through a forensic examination, or other means including, but not limited to images, video, contacts, conspirator phone numbers/addresses, text messages, email messages, ledgers, financial transaction information, electronic documents, or any other stored information relating to human trafficking, promoting prostitution and/or prostitution.

DETECTIVE RYAN HEFFERNAN Bremerton Police Department

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23 day of

X

JUDGE

STEVEN DIXON

Distribution-Original (Court Clerk); 1 copy (Prosecutor), 1 copy (Detective)

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 8



IN THE KITSAP COUNTY SUPERIOR COURTS

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

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> Plaintiff. ٧.

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT FOR FRUITS /

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SAMSUNG CELLULAR PHONE MODEL SPH-M580, ) INSTRUMENTALITIES AND / OR S/N DEC268435460810632413 BEING STORED IN ) EVIDENCE OF THE CRIMES OF

THE BREMERTON POLICE DEPARTMENT'S SECURE  $\,\hat{}\,$  RCW 9A.40.100 Human Trafficking  $\,\mathbb{I}^{\,\text{st}}\,$ EVIDENCE ROOM AS ITEM # "TP" IN CASE NUMBER ) Degree, RCW 9A.88.080 Promoting B13-001589 in the City of Bremerton,

) Prostitution 1st Degree and/or RCW

COUNTY OF KITSAP, STATE OF WASHINGTON,

9A.88.030 Prostitution

Defendant.

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L DETECTIVE RYAN HEFFERNAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say-I am a duly appointed, qualified, and acting detective assigned to the Bremerton Police Department's Special Operations Group (SOG), and am charged with responsibility for the investigation of criminal activity occurring within Kitsap County. I have probable cause to believe, and do, in fact, believe, that in violation of the laws of the State of Washington with respect to RCW 9A.40.100 Human Trafficking 1st Degree, RCW 9A.88.080 Promoting Prostitution 1th Degree and/or RCW 9A.88.030 Prostitution, evidence and/or fruits and/or instrumentalities of said offense(s) are presently being kept, stored or possessed, and can be located and seized in the above-described cellular phone. My belief being based upon information acquired through personal interviews with witnesses and other law enforcement officers, review of reports and personal observations, said information being as further described herein-

I have been employed as a police officer by the City of Bremerton Police Department since July 2006. I have been a SOG Detective since September 2011. Prior to becoming a police officer, I served as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Alaska. I received a BA with honors from Lafayette College (1998), and a JD from Rutgers School of Law (2002).

In July 2006, I attended 720 hours of training at the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Center in Burien, Washington. There, I received 14-hours of basic narcotics training.

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Russell D. Hauge, Prosecuting Attorney Adult Criminal and Administrative Divisions 614 Division Street, MS-35 Port Orchand, WA 98366-4681 (360) 337-7174; Fax (360) 337-4949

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The training included instruction in drug and drug paraphernalia identification, as well as identifying impairment indicators associated with specific drug use. Instruction pertained to each of the seven categories of drugs: depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, phencyclidine and narcotic analgesics.

In February of 2010 I attended an 80-hour basic drug enforcement class presented by the Drug Enforcement Administration. The training included, but was not limited to the following: pharmacology/drug ID, electronic narcotics' investigation, criminal interdiction, tactical entries and surveillance procedures

In September 2010 I attended a 24-hour methamphetamine investigations course presented by the Midwest Counterdrug Training Center. The training pertained to methamphetamine lab identification, and considerations for writing and executing methamphetamine related search warrants.

In November 2012, I attended 20 hours of training through the California Narcotics Officers Association (CNOA). The course topics included instruction on informant management, search and seizure issues, controlled buy and buy-bust operations, and undercover officer survival.

During my law enforcement career, I have participated in multiple narcotics investigations, which have resulted in arrests and seizures of various controlled substances including Marijuana, Cocaine, Methamphetamine, Black Tar Heroin, Ecstasy, Molly and Ketamine. Through these investigations and discussions with other experienced law enforcement agents, I have become familiar with the methods of packaging illegal narcotics, values of illegal narcotics, and terms associated with the manufacture, distribution and use of these substances. I have been an affiant for approximately 25 narcotics related search warrants, and participated in the execution of narcotics related search warrants that have resulted in arrests, and the discovery of illegal narcotics and items related to the use, packaging, distribution, and manufacturing of these substances.

In addition to narcotics related crimes, I have participated in investigations pertaining to prostitution. Through the course of these investigations, I have interviewed numerous prostitutes and pimps. I have found through my training and experience that these investigations often overlap with drug investigations. Specifically, I have learned that those individuals who promote

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 2



prostitution, commonly referred to as pimps, sometimes use drugs as a means to maintain control over prostitutes. It is common for those individuals who promote prostitution to pay prostitutes with drugs, and withhold drugs when they are dissatisfied with performance. Pimps will often utilize well established prostitutes to mentor new prostitutes, and facilitate their transition into the illicit activity. I also know that pimps and prostitutes will often utilize internet websites such as tnaboard.com and backpage.com to advertise for prostitution. Pimps and prostitutes will often use their cellular phones to post ads on these websites, and communicate with clients and each other about their illicit activities.

I also know that people engaged in prostitution perform their services either in a fixed location that they designate, such as a motel room, or in a location determined by the client. This distinction is commonly referred to as an "in" or "out" call. Because of the inherent dangers associated with prostitution, pimps or their agents will often drive prostitutes to out calls and remain in the area during the encounter. This practice provides a degree of perceived protection for the prostitute, and allows the pimp to immediately be paid for the service. In addition to driving their prostitutes to specific locations for out calls, I know from my training and experience that pimps often use their vehicles as a private meeting locations to discuss their criminal business enterprises, which often extend beyond promoting prostitution.

This affidavit is made in support of an application for a search warrant for the cellular telephone described as follows:

SAMSUNG CELLULAR PHONE MODEL SPH-M580, S/N DEC268435460810632413 BEING STORED IN THE BREMERTON POLICE DEPARTMENT'S SECURE EVIDENCE ROOM AS ITEM # "TP" IN CASE NUMBER B13-001589 IN THE CITY OF BREMERTON, COUNTY OF KITSAP, STATE OF WASHINGTON

PROBABLE CAUSE: Over the course of the last several months, SOG detectives have investigated the criminal activities of Anthony Parker (AKA Baby Deuce). Parker has an extensive criminal history including seven felony convictions, eleven gross misdemeanor convictions, three misdemeanor convictions and four "classification unknown" convictions. Through the course of the investigation, Detectives learned that Parker's former girlfriend, Lorena Llamas (AKA Crazy), groomed women to work as prostitutes for Parker while she (Llamas) was incarcerated in the Kitsap County jail. Detectives identified one of these prostitutes as Johanna Holliday. Holliday has no felony convictions, and five gross misdemeanor convictions

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 3



for the following: Theft 3<sup>rd</sup> degree, Minor in Possession/Consumption (three counts) and DUI. As set forth below, Parker used his Samsung Cellular phone model SPH-M580, S/N DEC268435460810632413 (hereinafter referred to as the "Phone") to communicate with Holliday, Llamas and clients about prostitution activities. There is probable cause to believe that evidence of human trafficking, promoting prostitution and/or prostitution will be found in the Phone, which is currently be stored in the Bremerton Police Department's secure evidence room.

Through a review of jail phone calls as well as contact with confidential informants and Jaccet associates, Detectives learned that Parker bailed Holliday out of jail in or around December 2012, and since that time has been involved in a dating relationship with Holliday and acted as her pimp. Detectives reviewed Holliday's ads for prostitution on backpage.com, which list phone numbers and addresses associated with Parker. Detectives performed surveillance, and confirmed that Holliday was living with Parker, and performing acts of prostitution at 1720 14<sup>th</sup> St in Bremerton Washington. The residence is believed to be owned by a family member of Llamas. Parker and Holliday have since moved to a residence at 703 S Summit Ave in Bremerton, Washington.

On 4/4/13, detectives observed Holliday participate in a drug transaction with Parker's associate, Travier Stevenson (AKA Little Jaccet). Detectives contacted Holliday on a traffic stop, and developed probable cause to arrest her for possession of a schedule II drug, Percocet. Holliday was in possession of a cellular phone, which detectives determined had been used to post advertisements for prostitution on backpage.com as well as to communicate with Parker and clients about prostitution. Detectives took of custody of the phone, and released Holliday.

On 4/8/13, detectives obtained a search warrant for Holliday's phone. Detectives examined the phone, which contained numerous text messages – many to Parker - pertaining to prostitution and drug activity. The phone also contained photos of Holliday that had been posted on backpage.com.

Upon her release, Holliday obtained a new phone and continued to post advertisements for prostitution on backpage.com listing the number (360) 551-9523. Detectives reviewed an advertisement Holliday posted on April 11th, 2013 at approximately 1828 hours. In that advertisement, Holliday posts six photographs of herself scantily-clad and in provocative poses. Her "screen name" on this advertisement is "Baby Doll."

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 4



Using a texting application with a fictitious name and phone number, detectives contacted Holliday at the new number, and inquired if she was available. Holliday told detectives that she was available, advising that the cost was \$200 per hour. Holliday also provided pricing information for two girls - "125 per person," for each half hour and "200 each" for an hour. Holliday said that she was available to meet at the Oyster Bay Inn, and asked detectives to "grab some condoms" and "lube. Detectives met with Holliday, and placed her into custody for possession of a schedule II drug, Percocet, and an outstanding warrant. At the time of her arrest, Holliday was in possession of a cellular phone, and received a call from Parker. Detectives believe that Parker called Holliday from the above-described Phone.

After being provided with her Miranda rights, Holliday agreed to speak with detectives. Holliday provided a taped statement, detailing her relationship with Llamas and Parker. Holliday confirmed that Parker has acted as her pimp and boyfriend since he bailed her out of jail approximately four months ago. Since that time, Holliday has lived with Parker and maintained a dating relationship with him. Holliday told detectives that Parker helped place her ads on backpage.com, responded to customers and kept nearly all of the money she made through prostitution. Parker saw it all as his money, and gave it out to Holliday as he saw fit. Although Parker was initially nice to Holliday and courted her as his girlfriend, he later forced her to work as a prostitute seven days a week, and left her alone for days at a time in the house demanding that she not spend time with her friends and family. Holliday told detectives that she lost everything she ever had – friends, family, possessions etc. over the last several months at the hands of Parker.

Holliday told detectives that she was terrified to leave Parker, and was isolated with nowhere else to go. When Holliday disobeyed Parker, he verbally abused her and often beat her severely. Detectives have reviewed numerous jail phone calls in which Parker berates Holliday, screaming, "You need to follow my orders . . . what the fuck I tell you from right now until I get the fuck out of here in three days." Parker also cautions Holliday that that "[her] money better be right when I get out." Parker instructs Holliday to help with his bail saying, "Take that little bit of chump change that you fucking got and give it to Jaccet." I know that Jaccet is the moniker used by Tyler Williams, the leader of the gang. When Holliday starts to sob, Parker says, "I don't want to hear any crying bitch. . . . stop crying nigga; I want someone to be making fucking moves."

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 5



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In addition to verbal abuse and threats, Holliday recounted numerous instances in which Parker assaulted, and imprisoned her in an effort to prevent her from leaving him. In one instance in or around the middle January, Parker became infuriated that Holliday had been with Anthony Flewellen, another Jaccet gang member and pimp. After scolding Holliday over the phone, Parker located Holliday at Flewellen's apartment at 901 Pleasant Ave in Bremerton. Parker came to the residence, and demanded to be let in. Jennifer Prerost, who was present at the residence with her (Prerost's) young daughter, allowed Parker inside the residence over Holliday's protests. Holliday huddled on the ground in Flewellen's locked bedroom, Parker came inside the residence, and broke down the bedroom door. Parker picked Holliday up off the ground by the hair, threw her against the wall and beat her face. Holliday was so terrified that she urinated in her pants. She later discovered large clumps of her hair missing. Detectives spoke to Prerost, who independently confirmed this account of events, telling detectives that it was one of the worst beatings she had ever witnessed. Detectives have also reviewed jail telephone calls, in which Parker tells Llamas that he beat Holliday for stealing from him. In addition, Detectives reviewed jail calls in which Holliday describes this portion of the assault in great detail to Llamas, who appeared more concerned about damage to the wall (Llamas mistakenly believed that the assault occurred in her residence).

Holliday told detectives that Parker took her from Flewellen's residence against her will to an unknown house on Houston Ave. Parker continued to beat Holliday about the head and face while in the car, which caused her to temporarily black out. Parker told Holliday that he planned to have his cousins the her down, and torture her at the residence. Instead, Parker took Holliday inside and retrieved a towel for her to clean the blood from her face. Parker then drove Holliday back to 1720 14th St where he continued to abuse her for the next several hours.

At one point, Parker took a handgun and held it to Holliday's head asking if she was ready to die. Parker made Holliday look down the chamber of the gun, which he pointed directly at her face. Holliday broke down in tears as she told detectives that she was terrified for her life. Parker eventually put the gun away, but continued to torment Holliday for the next several days, periodically beating her and demanding that she continue to see clients despite having a black eye, significant bruising and limited function of one of her arms.

Although this was the worst beating that Parker inflicted on Holliday, it was far from the

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 6



 last. He continued to beat her, often for no reason, in an effort to maintain her as a prostitute under his control. Parker assaulted Holliday as recently as 4/12/13, crushing her cheek against the wall of their apartment with his fist. Parker applied such a degree of pressure that Holliday feared he would break bones in her face. Holliday said that Parker treated her like a piece of property, and made it clear that he could leave her at any time. He expected complete obedience from Holliday, saying that she needed to always be on point, and Holliday lived in constant fear of being assaulted, or possibly killed if she could not perform to his expectations.

Holliday spoke extensively about Parker's gun, which she described as a small handgun with a large light on the barrel. Holliday, who is not familiar with guns, noted that it was similar in appearance to a semi-automatic handgun carried by a detective. Holliday told detectives that Parker referred to the gun as "Monster", and usually kept it hidden under his mattress. Holliday confirmed that Parker took the gun to the couple's new residence on S Summit Ave. Holliday told detectives that Parker asked her to move the gun from under the mattress to a bag in the garage. Parker made the request in a phone call from the jail. Detectives reviewed the call which occurred on or around 4/3/13 in which Parker tells Holliday to move "Monster" from under the mattress to a duffel bag in the attached garage. Holliday told detectives that she followed Parkers instructions, and placed the gun in a blue Victoria Secret clothing bag in the garage.

On 4/12/13 Detectives applied for a telephonic search warrant for Parker's residence. The Honorable Kitsap County Judge Jennifer Forbes issued the warrant allowing law enforcement to enter the residence to effectuate the arrest of Parker, and search for the firearm.

On 4/13/13 at approximately 1200, detectives and patrol officers went to the residence to serve the warrant. Parker, who could be seen inside the residence, refused repeated demands to exit. Because of the severity of the crimes and safety concerns associated with the handgun, the SWAT team responded to the scene. Parker came out of the residence at approximately 1500, and was placed into custody. During a search of the residence, detectives located a confirmed stolen Taurus 45 caliber semi-automatic handgun S/N NBO91701 equipped with a light on the barrel in a clothing bag in the garage.

At the time of his arrest, Parker was holding the above-described cellular Phone. The Phone was on, and connected to "Lil Jac" or "Lil Jaccet," which I know to be Travier Stevenson.

Detectives believe that Parker also used the phone to call Holliday while she was being placed

COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT; Page 7



COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH WARRANT, Page 8

into custody hours earlier. In addition, Detectives believe that Parker used the Phone to communicate with Llamas, advertise for prostitution on backpage.com, respond to customers on Holliday's behalf and/or otherwise further his criminal activities. Based on the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe that evidence of human trafficking 1<sup>st</sup> degree, promoting prostitution 1<sup>st</sup> degree and/or prostitution is currently being stored in the Phone.

I respectfully request that the court issue a search warrant allowing law enforcement to search and seize the following information from the Phone:

1. All information stored in the above-described cellular phone that can be extracted through a forensic examination, or other means including, but not limited to images, video, contacts, conspirator phone numbers/addresses, text messages, email messages, ledgers, financial transaction information, electronic documents, or any other stored information relating to human trafficking, promoting prostitution and/or prostitution.

DETECTIVE RYANGEFERNAN
Bremerton Police Department

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

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JUDGE STEVEN DIXON



Distribution-Original (Court Clerk); 1 copy (Prosecutor), 1 copy (Detective)

- I was in the area of a known establishment that we are aware 1 2 that many of these people involved with this investigation and other drug investigations frequent, when I observed 3 Ms. Holliday with another male in a vehicle. And what I 4 observed was Ms. Holliday driving in this vehicle with this 5 male, and there was another female following close behind 6 them, who I also recognized, in another vehicle. 7 stopped on a side road, which, again, was not a normal place 8 for them to stop. Ms. Holliday exited the vehicle, got into 9 the vehicle with the female, and at that point, it was 10. apparent to me that it was a short visit, which is typically 11 something that is indicative of a drug deal. 12
- 13. Q. Did you make contact with her?
- 14 A. We did.

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- 15 Q. And how did that come about?
  - A. I immediately, like I said before, I had Detective Heffernan on the phone, was letting him know what was going on, we arranged for a patrol officer to make a stop on the vehicle driven by the other female, and we contacted both Ms. Holliday and the female at that time.
  - Q. And who was with you at that point?
  - A. With me? I was by myself in my own vehicle, Detective

    Heffernan was in his vehicle, and I believe there was a few

    other patrol officers that assisted us in making the traffic

    stop.

- Q. Did you arrest Ms. Holliday at that point?
- A. I believe we detained Ms. Holliday, but she was not taken into custody, no.
  - Q. And when you say "detained," what do you mean by that?
  - A. By detained, I believe she may have been put in handcuffs and she was not free to leave from the scene. The same thing with the driver of the vehicle. They were not under arrest, but they were just being held there for questioning.
- Q. Okay. And when you did make contact with her, did you see any narcotics?
- 11 A. I didn't contact Ms. Holliday. I contacted the driver of the vehicle.
- 13 Q. Okay. Did you have any discussion with Ms. Holliday?
- 14 A. I believe Detective Heffernan spoke with Ms. Holliday at that incident.
- 16 Q. Do you recall whether any evidence was collected --
- 17 | A. Yes.

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- 18 Q. -- from Ms. Holliday?
- A. From what I recall, there was, I believe, drug paraphernalia and perhaps one Percocet pill was recovered from
- 21 Ms. Holliday.
- 22 Q. What about a cell phone?
- 23 A. Yes, her cell phone as well.
- 24 Q. Was that something you recovered or Detective Heffernan?
- 25 A. Those items were all recovered by Detective Heffernan.

- Q. Did you end up taking Ms. Holliday to the station or booking her on that day?
- A. No. We did the interview. I interviewed the other female.

  Detective Heffernan interviewed Ms. Holliday at the scene of the traffic stop.
- 6 Q. And what was the reason why you didn't book her?
  - A. I believe we wanted her -- we were looking for cooperation and I believe we had a -- she made an agreement with Detective Heffernan to meet up the following day for a more thorough interview.
- 11 | Q. And did she show up that following day?
- 12 A. She did not.

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- Q. Now, pointing you to a couple weeks later, did you set up another way to contact Ms. Holliday?
- A. We did. About a week or so later, we, Detective Sergeant

  Plumb and I, decided to -- We were aware that Ms. Holliday

  had created a posting and we set up a sting operation in a

  way to contact Ms. Holliday.
- 19 Q. And where did that contact come about?
- 20 A. That contact occurred at the Oyster Bay Inn on Kitsap Way in Bremerton.
- 22 Q. And can you just describe your involvement?
- A. My involvement on that, I was -- At the time, I was

  conducting surveillance of the South Summit house that I

  mentioned before. We believed that Ms. Holliday was perhaps

put on that I am Anthony Parker and that I am a pimp and my occupation is sell a hoe, could I not?

A. Yes, you could.

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
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
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
- 4 Q. And there would be no one stopping me from doing that, would there?
- 6 A. No, I suppose not.
- 7 Q. So how do we know that any of this information on Facebook is accurate?
  - A. Well, again, I'm not saying -- There's no indication that what's posted on here is accurate, but I do think that you could link it to Mr. Parker, because the information isn't contained only on the Facebook page. And some of the things that are mentioned in it, they correlate with what was said in the phone calls or what was on his phone, for instance. I mean, somebody could create a page, but then to have that on the actual person's phone, that would be very unlikely.
  - Q. Did you subpoend his e-mail?
- 18 A. I did not
- Q. Okay. Do you know if Mr. Parker had access to his e-mail other than through that phone there?
- 21 A. Other than through the phone, I don't know.
- Q. Okay. Do you know if Mr. Parker was the only person who had access to this phone here?
  - A. I don't know for certain. Ms. Holliday may have had access at that point to the phone.


MPDENDIX + PRIVATE INFORMATION

## Messages To And from PARKER













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
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


















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If nothing happens when you click this link, please copy the link above and paste it into your web browser.

DON'T DELETE THIS EMAIL - you might need this link to enhance edit or delete your post in the future.

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
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
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
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
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


Messages To And Messages From PARKER

















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









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
































































































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
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
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
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




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



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APPENDIX#5 MOTION TO Suppress

# IN THE COURT OF APPEALS of The State of Washington Division II

State of Washington Plaintiff,

v.

Anthony D. Parker Defendant No. 13-1-00597-1

Defendant's MOTION to SUPPRESS EVIDENCE and DISMISS THE CASE Pursuant to CrR 3.5/3.6

#### I. Motion

COMES NOW the Defendant/Appellant, Anthony D. Parker, by and through his own accord Pro Se, and MOVES this Court for an ORDER to Suppress Evidence and Dismiss or Remand for New Trial pursuant to CrR 3.5/3.6 and Affidavit of Facts in Part II.

## II. Affidavit of Facts

This declaration is made pursuant to CrR 3.5 and 3.6. Under no circumstances should this declaration be considered a waiver of attorney-client privilege, or any other privilege while on direct appeal.

For the purpose of this motion, the State sought to

Def. Mot. to Suppress Evid. and Dismiss

Pg. 1 of 6

admit evidence of a cell phone belonging to Johanna Holliday, which was taken from her on April 4, 2013 by a Bremerton Police officer without her consent, without a warrant, and absent a search incident to arrest. On April 4, 2013, Holliday was detained for a possible drug violation by the Bremerton Police. Officer Heffernan went to the vehicle and withdrew Holliday's purse and cell phone. One pill was found. Officer Heffernan told Holliday he was taking her cell phone. This was done without her consent given. Holliday was released from her detainment and agreed she would meet with them the following day.

Holliday did not meet with them as planned, but was arrested on April 12, 2013, due to police setting up a sting to arrest her.

Prior to the arrest of Holliday, officer Heffernan sought a warrant on April 8, 2013, for evidence, to wit, the cell phone that was unlawfully seized. Stored inside the phone was a wealth of Parker's personal information, such as an email account with Backpage, provocative pictures of Holliday, and private communications through text messages. The phone was seized without a warrant or consent from Holliday or Parker.

The information that was obtained unlawfully sent police to setting up a sting to arrest Holliday, by which

Def. Mot. to Suppress Evid. and Dismiss

she was arrested on the 12th of April, upon which she was interviewed and spoke to the detective of other crimes, but mainly about a firearm. Parker was arrested later that day along with the firearm.

This Motion comes post-conviction, because the Kitsap County Superior Court erred when the court failed to suppress at the Reference Hearing, and is attached to Defendant's Personal Restraint Petition for this Court to review.

I, Anthony D. Parker, do swear under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature

Dickerson v. Wainwright, 626 F.2d 1184 (1980)

## . III. Argument and Supporting Authority

Washington State Constitution Article 1, Section 7, provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without Authority of law."

Thus, Article 1, Section 7 "...clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no express limitations."

State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 110, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. <u>U.S. Const. Amend. IV</u>. "Searches and seizures that offend the Fourth Amendment are unlawful, and evidence obtained as a direct or indirect

Def. Mot. to Suppress Evid. and Dismiss result of such invasions is considered 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule." <u>United States v. McClendon</u>, 713 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2013).

Disturbing a person's private affairs without

Authority of law is contrary to Article 1, Section 7, of
the Washington State Constitution. The State Constitution
is at least coextensive with the federal constitution, so
any warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment also
implicates Art. 1, §7 of our state constitution. See State
v. Coss, 87 Wn.App. at 906.

On April 4, 2013, Officer Heffernan disturbed and intruded into Parker's private affairs when he took a cell phone as evidence to be used against Parker. There was no consent from Holliday or Parker, and their was no warrant, nor was the phone seized incident to arrest. Officer Heffernan acted without the 'Authority of Law,' thus violating Parker's protection right that is guaranteed by Article 1, Section 7 and the Fourth Amendment.

Absent a valid warrant to seize the cell phone as evidence, any and all evidence obtained and derived from the search of that phone must be suppressed as 'fruits of the poisonous tree.' See <u>State v. Meaghan</u>, 165 Wn.App. 782, 266 P.3d 222 (2012).

Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution

State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656, 663, 222 P.3d 92 (2009). Warrantless searches and seizures are presumed unlawful unless and exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 141, 187 P.3d 248 (2008). Consent is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 131, 101 P.3d 80 (2004).

Under our state constitution, officers of the law must have actual authority of the law to intrude into private affairs, even the affairs of bad men. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 636, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009).

Evidence can be collected without a search warrant only when it is obtained incident to a lawful arrest. State v. Smith, 56 Wn.2d 368, 353 P.2d 155 (1960).

When an unconstitutional search or seizure occurs, all subsequently uncovered evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed. State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 360.

In balancing the legitimate needs of law enforcement to obtain information in criminal investigations against the privacy interest of individuals, the Washington Privacy Act, Washington Revised Code ch. 9.73, unlike similar statutes in other states, tips the balance in favor of individual privacy at the expense of law enforcement's

Def. Mot. to Suppress Evid. and Dismiss

ability to gather evidence without a warrant. State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d at 872.

The essence of the constitutional provision prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures is not merely that evidence so acquired shall not be used before a court, but that it shall not be used at all. <u>United States</u> v. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485.

Therefore, the evidence obtained from the unlawful seizure of the cell phone must be suppressed, and the case dismissed or remanded for a new trial because the former convictions were obtained through fruit of the poisonous tree. Hinton, supra at 862.

#### Conclusion

The trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence that the police seized in violation of the Defendant's right to privacy under Washington State Constitution, Article 1, Section 7, and United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment. As a result, this Court should reverse the Defendant's conviction for a new trial and remand with instructions to grant the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

Respectfully submitted,

Anthony D. Parker

Def. Mot. to Suppress Evid. and Dismiss

Pg. 6 of 6

# AFFIDAVIT

I, AnTHONY D. Parker, an immate who resides AT Stafford Creek Correction Center do solemnly swear under the laws of penalty and perjury of the State of Washington that the following is true and correct to the best of my Knowledge.

Song Parker Date 3-6-18


State of Lashmoton Country of Greys Harbor

Signed or attested before Mc on 3-6-18 by Anthony Parker

Borla ast

6-4-50

Notary Public
State of Washington
BARBARA A. ST. LOUIS
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
JUNE 4, 2020



### FILED COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II

## STATEMENT OF FINANCES:

2018 MAR -8 AM II: 34

	If you cannot afford to pay the \$250 filing fee or cannot afford to pay an attorney to help ll out this form. If you have enough money for these, do not fill out this part of the form. If atly in confinement, please attach a copy of your prison finance statement.
1.	I do X do not ask the court to file this without making me pay the \$250 filing fee because I am so poor and cannot pay the fee.
2.	I have \$ in my prison or institution account. (NOTE: you
	must complete #2 of this statement, whether you submit a copy of your prison account
	summary or not).
3.	I do X do not ask the court to appoint a lawyer for me because I am so poor and cannot afford to pay a lawyer.
<b>4.</b>	I am X am not employed. My salary or wages amount of \$ a month. My employer is
5.	During the past 12 months I did did not get any money from a business, profession or other form of self-employment. (please identify type of self-employment here) and the total income I received was \$
6.	During the past 12 months I:
	I did did not _X receive any rent payments, if so, the total I received was \$
	I did did not _X receive any interest. If so, the total I received was
	I did did not _X receive any dividends. If so, the total I received was \$
s_Ø	I did did not X receive any other money. If so, the total I received was
financ	I do do not have any each except as said in question 2 of this statement of es. If so the total amount I have is \$
	I do do not _X have any savings or checking accounts. If so, the total amount in all accounts is \$
	I do do not own stocks, bonds or notes. If so, their total value is: \$
7.	List all real estate and other property or things of value that belong to you or in which you have an interest. Tell what each item or property is worth and how much you owe on it. Do not list household furniture and furnishings and clothing that you or your family need:

01/09/2018 **KFALLISON**  Department of Corrections

STAFFORD CREEK CORRECTIONS CENTER

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**OIRPLRAR** 10.2.1.18

PLRA IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS REPORT FOR DEFINED PERIOD : 06/30/2017 ... TO 2 12/31/2

DOC#:

0000776122

NAME: PARKER ANTHONY

ADMIT DATE:

01/16/2014

ADMIT TIME:

DOB:

06/15/1979

23.30

10:50

AVERAGE MONTHLY RECEIPTS

RECEIPTS

4.66

AVERAGE SPENDABLE BALANCE 22.89

20% OF SPENDABLE

State of Ubshington

County of Grous

Signed or Attested before Me

STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OFFICE OF CORRECTIONAL OPERATIONS STAFFORD CREEK CORRECTION CENTER CERTIFIED BY: 2. alluin

**Notary Public** State of Washington BARBARA A. ST. LOUIS MY COMMISSION EXPIRES JUNE 4, 2020